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"The duty to give evidence is a normal civic duty in a democratic society. (..) That duty will suffice to 
justify an interference created by an obligation to testify on the ground that it is necessary for the 
maintenance of the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. (..) The Commission recalls that in a 
criminal trial, it is for the judge to consider the evidences before the court, and to assess its relevance 
and admissibility. The judge can only perform this function if he has powers to require the production 
of evidence before the court in the first place (..). The full picture should be before the criminal court"  
 
(European Commission of Human Rights 18 January 1996, BBC v. the United Kingdom, Appl. 25798/94, 
Decisions & Reports, 1994 - 84 A, 129) 
 
"Having regard to the importance of the protection of journalistic sources for press freedom in a dem-
ocratic society and the potentially chilling effect an order of source disclosure has on the exercise of 
that freedom, such a measure cannot be compatible with Article 10 of the Convention, unless it is 
justifiable by an overriding requirement in the public interest"  
 
(European Court of Human Rights 27 March 1996, Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, § 39). 
 
1. The protection of journalistic sources and the freedom of expression and information 
One of the most fundamental rules of journalistic ethics, recognised in national and international codes, 
is that a journalist shall protect confidential sources of information. The obligation of journalists to 
maintain the confidentiality of their sources may come into conflict with the request of a litigant, a 
prosecutor, a judge, a court or any other investigative authority to ascertain the identity of a source for 
the purposes of proof, taking further action against the source or conducting further information. As a 
witness, journalists can be required to answer all relevant questions put to them and to provide the 
relevant documents in order to facilitate the due administration of justice. Consequently, the admin-
istration of justice is denied by a journalist refusing to identify a source and refusing to help to bring all 
the relevant information before the court. 
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Within the journalistic profession however it is considered as a "sacrosanct" obligation not to reveal the 
identity of a (confidential) source, even if the journalist risks to be prosecuted or convicted because of a 
refusal of a disclosure order. 
The reasons behind this principle are obvious. 
Journalists often receive leaked documents or information from sources who wish to remain anony-
mous, for instance because the information was intended to remain secret or confidential within a 
certain (private or public) organisation. Leaked information is an important source of journalistic input 
and it is only when journalists can guarantee the confidentiality and the anonymity of their sources that 
this crucial aspect of the news flow is protected. The idea is that journalists' sources are to be protect-
ed, otherwise sources of information may dry up. Journalists cultivate sources by promising them confi-
dentiality. 
As G. Robertson and A. Nicol point out in their handbook on media law: 
"The cultivation of sources is thus professionally essential for journalists. It is a basic tool of their trade, 
the means by which newsworthy information is extracted, other than from those paid to give it a partic-
ular spin. Were it not for "unofficial sources" obligingly talking "off the record" to journalists, there 
would simply be much less news in the newspapers. There would be fewer facts and less information for 
discussion, for dispute and sometimes for retraction, in democratic society (..). If sources, frightened of 
exposure and reprisal, decide not to talk, there will not only be less news, but the news which is pub-
lished, will be less reliable. It will not be checked for spin"2. 
As the input of information coming from persons who want to remain anonymous, as e.g. whistle-
blowers, is extremely important for investigative journalists, and as this kind of journalism due to eco-
nomic and commercial developments in the media sector by itself already has problems to develop, or 
even to survive, at least the legal protection of journalistic sources should be guaranteed. An ultimate 
goal and important perspective of the freedom of expression is the right of the public to be properly 
informed on matters of public interest. From this perspective proactive and investigative journalism is a 
crucial approach in order not to report only official sources or to rely solely on data and information the 
journalist has (passively) received on the news desk. 
The crucial reason for not compelling journalists to reveal their sources of information or not compelling 
them to produce documents, files, pictures or film on demand of the police or the judiciary is that it 
would be a very negative evolution if the people in general, and (potential) sources specifically, would 
have the impression that the press and journalists can be easily incorporated in the work of police and 
the judiciary. It is important in other words to avoid, to prevent that the impression would grow that 
the press is a kind of an extension piece or an instrument of the institutionalised powers in society. The 
press and journalists should not be considered as virtual collaborators, neither as tools for police inves-
tigation, judicial prosecution or other law enforcement bodies. 
This reasoning is not only developed by the journalistic sector itself, in ethical codes of journalistic prac-
tice, in media sociology or in journalism studies.  
Within the Council of Europe the importance of the protection of journalistic sources is emphasized in 
the light of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Resolution No. 2 of the Prague 
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Ministerial Conference on Mass Media Policy (1994) refers to the protection of journalistic sources as a 
prerequisite for the freedom of expression and information in order to "enable journalism to contribute 
to the maintenance and development of genuine democracy"3.  
 
The protection of journalistic sources on the basis of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights is recognised by the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Goodwin versus the United 
Kingdom (27 March 1996), a landmark judgment for the protection of journalistic sources: 
"Without such protection, sources may be deterred from assisting the press in informing the public on 
matters of public interest. As a result the vital public watchdog role of the press may be undermined and 
the ability of the press to provide accurate and reliable information may be adversely affected". 
The Court also decided: 
"Having regard to the importance of the protection of journalistic sources for press freedom in a demo-
cratic society and the potentially chilling effect an order of source disclosure has on the exercise of that 
freedom, such a measure cannot be compatible with Article 10 of the Convention, unless it is justifiable 
by an overriding requirement in the public interest". 
2. The protection of journalists’ sources, the European Convention (Art. 10) and the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights 
The quotation of the European Court's judgment in Goodwin v. the United Kingdom makes clear that 
the protection of journalistic sources is not absolute. As this right is rooted in Article 10 of the European 
Convention, there might be reasons, responsibilities, duties that can restrict in one way or another the 
right of a journalist to keep his sources protected. An interference in the journalist's right to freedom of 
expression and information is not to be considered as a breach of Article 10 of the Convention if such 
interference is prescribed by law and is necessary in a democratic society for the legitimate aim pur-
sued, such as the protection of the rights of other, the authority or the impartiality of the judiciary or 
the prevention of disorder or crime. Article 10 § 2 of the Convention shapes the framework for the 
balancing of the freedom of expression as a fundamental human right in a democracy with other human 
rights and freedoms
4
. 
The European Court indeed has explicitly decided that an order of source disclosure is possible in cer-
tain circumstances, that is if interests are involved that are more imperative and more important than 
freedom of expression. According to the European Court it is however only when it is "justifiable by an 
overriding requirement in the public interest" that a disclosure order can be assumed to be in accord-
ance with Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. It is also underlined by the Court that limitations on the 
confidentiality of journalistic sources "call for the most careful scrutiny by the Court". 
Goodwin v. the United Kingdom (violation Article 10) 
In the Goodwin case the European Court came to the conclusion that the order compelling the journal-
ist William Goodwin to reveal his sources was a breach of Article 10 of the Convention. The case con-
cerned a young journalist in 1989 working for an economic magazine The Engineer. Goodwin was given 
information by a source about a commercial company, Tetra. This information was derived from an 
internal and strictly confidential corporate plan. The document indicated that the company was experi-
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encing financial difficulties. After Goodwin contacted the company in order to check the facts and seek 
its comments on the information, the company started a procedure in order to find out who of its em-
ployees leaked the sensitive and confidential information. Goodwin was ordered by the judge to dis-
close his notes on the grounds that it was necessary in the interests of justice within the meaning of 
Section 10 of the Contempt of Court Act of 1981, for the source's identity to be disclosed in order to 
enable Tetra to bring proceedings against the source and to recover the document, obtain an injunction 
preventing further publication or seek damages for the expenses to which it had been put. The Court of 
Appeal finally gave order to Goodwin either to disclose his notes to Tetra or to deliver them to the 
Court in a sealed envelope with accompanying affidavit. This order was upheld by the House of Lords in 
1990. Goodwin however did not comply with this order, which led to a judgment of the High Court who 
fined the applicant £ 5.000 for contempt of court
5
.  
In its judgment of 27 March 1996 the European Court concluded that both the order requiring Goodwin 
to reveal his source and the fine imposed on him for having refused to do so gave rise to a violation of 
his right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention. In the Court's view there was no 
reasonable relationship of proportionality between the legitimate aim pursued by the disclosure order 
and the means deployed to achieve them. The restriction which the disclosure order entailed on Good-
win could not be regarded as having been necessary in a democratic society. 
De Haes en Gijsels v. Belgium (violation Article 10) 
The protection of journalistic sources may also be applicable in cases where the journalist is not a wit-
ness, but a person accused or held liable for defamatory statements. Such cases can be considered from 
the scope of Article 6 of the Convention (right to a fair trial). In its judgment in the case of De Haes and 
Gijsels v. Belgium the European Court of Human Rights applied the right of journalists not to disclose 
their source to a specific defamation case. An editor and a journalist had been convicted of defamation 
by the Brussels' civil Court of first instance, a judgment which was confirmed later by the Court of Ap-
peal and the Supreme Court (Court of Cassation). De Haes and Gijsels were held liable for defamation in 
criticising some members of the judiciary. According to the Belgian courts, during the procedure the 
journalist and the editor did not sufficiently proof the truth of their allegations, as they had refused to 
prove the truth of the defaming information by disclosing their source. Their allegations however had 
been based on statements by court experts in other prior cases. For that reason De Haes and Gijsels had 
invited the Court of first instance and the Court of Appeal to order that these documents, already in the 
possession of other Belgian courts, would be submitted as evidence before the courts dealing with the 
defamation case in which the journalist and the editor were the defendants. The Belgian courts howev-
er were of the opinion that the request for production of documents demonstrated the lack of care with 
which De Haes and Gijsels had written their articles. 
 
In its judgment of 24 February 1997 the European Court of Human Rights held that under Article 6 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights, national courts may not reject an application from an ac-
cused journalist to consider alternative evidence beside the disclosure of the source of information by 
this journalist, if such alternative evidence for the proof of the journalist's statements is available to the 
judiciary. The Court was of the opinion that the journalist's and the editor's concern not to risk com-
promising their sources of information by lodging the documents in question themselves, was legiti-
mate. The outright rejection by the Belgian courts to study at least the opinion of the three experts 
whose reports had prompted De Haes and Gijsels to write their articles was considered as a breach of 
Article 6 of the Convention, as this rejection was to be regarded as a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis 
the plaintiffs in the defamation case. There was therefore a breach of the principle of equality of arms. 
And hence a violation of Article 6 of the Convention, with reference to the protection of journalistic 
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sources as protected by Article 10 of the Convention
6
. 
 
In other judgments the Court has reiterated that journalist have an obligation to rely on a sufficient 
solid, factual basis for the publication of critical remarks or defamatory allegations but that such an 
obligation does not imply that they have to reveal the identity of the persons who have provided them 
the information they have relied on
7
. 
 
Fressoz and Roire v. France (violation Article 10) 
 
In the judgment in the case Fressoz and Roire v. France the Court was of the opinion that "journalists 
cannot, in principle, be released from their duty to obey the ordinary criminal law on the basis that 
Article 10 affords them protection", in casu in the light of the question if journalists were allowed to 
use, publish or refer to leaked, confidential documents falling under the protection of professional 
secrecy of others. The case concerned the conviction of Fressoz and Roire, the publishing director and a 
journalist of Le Canard Enchaîné, because of the publication of confidential tax files of the chief execu-
tive officer of Peugeot. According to the Court journalists however can invoke the protection of Article 
10 of the Convention, as it falls to be decided whether "in particular circumstances of the case, the 
interest in the public's being informed outweighed the "duties and responsibilities" the applicants had 
as a result of the suspect origin of the documents that were sent to them". In the judgment of 21 Janu-
ary 1999 the Court reached the conclusion that the conviction of Fressoz and Roire because of the pub-
lication of confidential tax files violated Article 10 of the Convention
8
. The judgment gives additional 
protection to journalists using information or documents from confidential sources who themselves 
have breached a duty of confidentiality. 
Roemen and Schmit v. Luxembourg (violation Article 10) 
In the case of Roemen and Schmit v. Luxembourg the European Court of Human Rights again recognised 
the importance of the protection of journalistic sources. At the origin of this case lies an article in the 
Lëtzëbuerger Journal in which Robert Roemen reported that a Minister was convicted of tax evasion, 
commenting that such conduct was all the more shameful coming from a public person who should set 
an example. The article reported that the Minister had been ordered to pay a tax fine of LUF 100.000 
(nearly EUR 2.500). This information was based on an internal document that was leaked from the Land 
Registry and Land Property Office. The Minister lodged a criminal complaint and an investigation was 
opened in order to identify the civil servant(s) who had handled the file under a breach of professional 
confidence. On instructions of the investigative judge searches were carried out at the journalist's home 
and place of work and at his lawyer's office. Both lodged several applications to set aside the investigat-
ing judge's instructions and the investigative measure undertaken on the strength of them, particularly 
the searches. All of these applications were dismissed by the Luxembourg domestic courts. Roemen and 
Schmit applied before the European Court in Strasbourg, alleging a breach of Article 6, 8 and 10 of the 
Convention. In its judgment of 25 February 2003 the Court came to the conclusion that the searching of 
the journalist's home and office was to be considered as a violation of Article 10 of the Convention
9
. 
Confirming its case law the Court considered that "having regard to the importance of the protection of 
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journalistic sources for press freedom in a democratic society and the potentially chilling effect an order 
of source disclosure has on the exercise of that freedom, such a measure cannot be compatible with 
Article 10 of the Convention, unless it is justifiable by an overriding requirement in the public interest". 
The Court recognised that the searches carried out in the journalist's home and place of work were 
prescribed by law and pursued the legitimate aim of maintaining the public order and preventing crime. 
However, because the article had discussed a matter of general interest, the search interferences could 
not be compatible with Article 10 of the Convention unless they were justified by an "overriding re-
quirement in the public interest". The Court was of the opinion that the Luxembourg authorities had 
not shown that the balance between the interests at stake had been preserved. The Court underlined 
that the search warrant gave the investigate officers very wide powers to burst in on a journalist at his 
place of work and gave them access to all the documents in his possession. The reasons adduced by the 
Luxembourg authorities could not be regarded as sufficient to justify the searches of the journalist's 
home and place of work. Therefore the Court comes to the conclusion that the investigative measures 
in issue had been disproportionate and had infringed Roemen’s right to freedom of expression. The 
judgment also confirms the Court's case law that in principle the secrecy of communication between a 
lawyer and his or her client falls under the protection of privacy as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Con-
vention. The Court considered that the search carried out by the Luxembourg judicial authorities at the 
lawyer's office and the seizure of a document had amounted to an unacceptable interference with her 
right to respect for her private life, and hence amounted to a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. 
The Court emphasized that the search carried out at the lawyer's office clearly amounted to a breach of 
the journalist's source through the intermediary of his lawyer. The Court held that the search had there-
fore been disproportionate to the legitimate aims pursued, particularly in view of the rapidity with 
which the search order had been carried out. 
 
It is to be underlined that the Court clearly expressed the opinion that the searches carried out in the 
journalist's home and place of work and at his lawyer's office are even a greater treath to freedom of 
expression of journalists than a (court) order to reveal their sources. According to the Court a search is 
"un acte plus grave", as it gives access to all documents which a journalist has in his possession: "La 
Cour juge que des perquisitions ayant pour but de découvrir la source du journaliste - même si elles 
restent sans résultat - constituent un acte plus grave qu'une sommation de divulgation de l'identité de 
la source". The Court emphasises that the searches at Roemen's home and place of work "avaient un 
effet encore plus conséquent sur la protection des sources que dans l'affaire Goodwin". 
 
Ernst and others v. Belgium (violation Article 10) 
Also in the case of Ernst and others v. Belgium  the Court found a violation of the rights of journalists to 
have their sources protected
10
. In 1995, searches took place in offices of Belgian media on the instruc-
tions of the investigative judge in charge of the case on the murder of André Cools, Minister of State 
and former head of the Socialist Party who was killed in Liège in 1991. The searches were carried out at 
the news desks of some newspapers (Le Soir, Le Soir Illustré and De Morgen), in the head office of the 
RTBF, the public broadcasting company of the French Community. Searches were also carried out in the 
homes of five journalists. Files, diskettes and hard disks of computers belonging to the journalists were 
taken for investigation. The background to these measures was that leaks in this and other very sensi-
tive criminal cases had prompted proceedings against members of the judiciary on a charge of breach of 
professional confidence. 
Some of the newspapers, four journalists, the society of professional journalists of Le Soir and the Bel-
gian association of professional journalists (AGJPB/AVBB) applied before the European Court, alleging a 
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violation of Article 6, 8, 10, 13
11
 and 14
12
 of the Convention. Relying on Article 10 of the Convention they 
asserted that the searches and the seizures carried out on their premises constituted an interference 
with the exercise of their freedom of expression. The applicants argued that "les perquisitions massives 
et les saisies constitueraient une ingérence inqualifiable des autorités belges dans l'exercice de la liberté 
d'expression. Cette ingérence ne saurait être considéré comme une restriction prévue par la loi, poursui-
vant un but légitime et nécessaire dans une société démocratique", and that "les perquisitions et saisies 
qui ont eu lieu à leur domicile et dans certains rédactions sont constitutives d'une violation du secret des 
sources du journaliste". 
 
In a decision of 25 June 2002 the Strasbourg Court declared the application of the news media and the 
journalists admissible. The Court was of the opinion that the case raised important questions of fact and 
law, which cannot be resolved at the stage of the admissibility but require an examination on the mer-
its
13
. The application by Le Soir Professional Journalists Society and the General Association of Profes-
sional Journalists in Belgium however was dismissed as both organisations were not be considered as a 
"victim" in the sense of Article 34 of the Convention. 
 
The European Court in its judgment of 15 July 2003 has come to the conclusion that the searches and 
seizures were neglecting the protection of journalistic sources protected by the right of freedom of 
expression and the right of privacy. The Court agreed that the interferences by the Belgian judicial au-
thorities were prescribed by law and intended to prevent the disclosure of information received in 
confidence and to maintain the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. The Court considered that 
the searches and seizures which were intended to assemble information that could lead to the identifi-
cation of police officers or members of the judiciary leaking confidential information came within the 
sphere of protection of journalistic sources, an issue which called for the most careful scrutiny by the 
Court. The Court emphasised the large scale of the searches that had been performed, while at no stage 
it had been alleged that the applicants had written articles containing secret information about the 
cases. The Court questioned also whether other means could not have been employed to identify those 
responsible for the breaches of confidence and especially took in consideration that the police officers 
involved in the operation of the searches had very wide investigative powers. The Court found that the 
Belgian authorities had not shown that the searches and seizures on such a large scale had been rea-
sonably proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued and therefore came to the conclusion that there 
has been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. The Court, for analogue reasons, also found a viola-
tion of the right of privacy protected under Article 8 of the Convention. 
 
Nordisk Film & TV A/S v. Denmark (no violation of Article 10) 
 
In August 2002, by judgment of the Danish Supreme Court (Højesteret) Nordisk Film & TV, was com-
pelled to hand over limited specified unedited footage and notes of a broadcasted television pro-
gramme investigating paedophilia in Denmark. For making the programme, a journalist went undercov-
er. He participated in meetings of "The Paedophile Association" and interviewed with hidden camera 
two members of the association who made incriminating statements regarding the realities of paedo-
philia in both Denmark and India, including advice on how to induce a child to chat over the internet 
and how easy it was to procure children in India. In the documentary broadcasted on national television 
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false names were used and all persons' faces and voices were blurred. The day after the broadcast of 
the programme one of the interviewed persons, called "Mogens", was arrested and charged with sexual 
offences. For further investigation the Copenhagen Police requested that the un-shown portions of the 
recordings made by the journalist be disclosed. The journalist and the editor of the applicant company's 
documentary unit refused the request. Also the Copenhagen City Court and the High Court refused to 
grant the requested court order having regard to the need of the media to be able to protect their 
sources. The Supreme Court however found against the applicant company, so that the latter was com-
pelled to hand over some parts of the unedited footage which solely related to "Mogens". The court 
order explicitly exempted the recordings and notes that would entail a risk of revealing the identity of 
some persons (a victim, a police officer and the mother of a hotel manager), who were interviewed 
while they were promised by the journalist that they could participate without the possibility of being 
identified. In November 2002 Nordisk Film & TV complained in Strasbourg that the Supreme Court's 
judgment breached its rights under Article 10 of the Convention, referring to the European Court's case 
law affording a high level of protection of journalistic sources. 
In its decision of 8 December 2005 the Strasbourg Court has come to the conclusion that the judgment 
of the Danish Supreme Court did not violate Article 10 of the Convention. The Strasbourg Court is of the 
opinion that the applicant company was not ordered to disclose its journalistic sources of information, 
but that it was rather ordered to hand over part of its own-research material. The Court is not con-
vinced that the degree of protection applied in this case can reach the same level as that afforded to 
journalists when it becomes to their right to keep their sources confidential under Article 10 of the 
Convention. The Court is also of the opinion that it is the state's duty to take measures designed to 
ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are not subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment, 
including such ill-treatment administered by private individuals. These measures should provide effec-
tive protection, in particular, of children and other vulnerable persons and include reasonable steps to 
prevent ill-treatment or sexual abuse of children of which the authorities had or ought to have 
knowledge. The European Court supports the opinion of the Danish Supreme Court that the non-edited 
recordings and the notes made by the journalist could assist the investigation and production of evi-
dence in the case against "Mogens" and that it concerned the investigation of alleged serious criminal 
offences. Of particular importance is that the Supreme Court's judgment explicitly guaranteed that 
material which entailed the risk of revealing the identity of the journalist's sources was exempted from 
the court order and that the order only concerned the handover of a limited part of the unedited foot-
age as opposed to more drastic measures such as for example a search of the journalist's home and 
workplace. In these circumstances the Strasbourg Court is satisfied that the order was not dispropor-
tionate to the legitimate aim pursued and that the reasons given by the Danish Supreme Court in justifi-
cation of those measures were relevant and sufficient. Hence Article 10 of the Convention has not been 
violated. The application is manifestly ill-founded and is declared inadmissible. 
The decision of the European Court makes clear that the Danish Supreme Court's order to compel the 
applicant to hand over the unedited footage is to be considered as an interference in the applicant's 
freedom of expression within the meaning of Article 10 § 1 of the Convention. In casu the interference 
however meets all the conditions of Article 10 § 2, including the justification as being "necessary in a 
democratic society". The Strasbourg Court is also of the opinion that the Supreme Court and the Danish 
legislation (Art. 172 and 804-805 of the Administration of Justice Act) clearly acknowledge that an inter-
ference with the protection of journalistic sources cannot be compatible with Article 10 of the Conven-
tion unless it is justified by an overriding requirement in the public interest, hence reflecting the ap-
proach developed in the Strasbourg Court's jurisprudence in the case of Goodwin v. the United Kingdom 
(1996), Roemen and Schmit v. Luxembourg (2003) and Ernst and others v. Belgium (2003)14. 
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Voskuil v. the Netherlands (violation of Article 10) 
 
This case concerns the complaint of a journalist, Mr. Voskuil, having been denied the right not to dis-
close the source he had relied on for writing two articles in the newspaper Sp!ts. As he had refused to 
reveal his source to the authorities, Voskuil was detained for more than two weeks, in an attempt to 
compel him to reveal the identity of his source.  
In essence the Court was struck by the lengths to which the Netherlands authorities had been prepared 
to go to learn the source's identity. Such far-reaching measures could but discourage those who had 
true and accurate information relating to wrongdoing from coming forward in the future and sharing 
their knowledge with the press. The Court found that the Government's interest in knowing the identity 
of the journalist's source had not been sufficient to override the journalist's interest in concealing it. 
There had therefore been a violation of Article 10
15
. 
 
Tillack v. Belgium (violation of Article 10)  
In another case the journalist H.M. Tillack applied for a violation by the Belgian authorities of this right 
of protection of sources. Tillack has been suspected of having bribed a civil servant by paying him 
EUR 8,000 in exchange for confidential information concerning investigations in progress in the Europe-
an institutions. Tillack's home and workplace were searched and almost all his working papers and tools 
were seized and placed under seal (16 crates of papers, two boxes of files, two computers, four mobile 
phones and a metal cabinet). The European Court emphasized that a journalist's right not to reveal her 
or his sources could not be considered a mere privilege to be granted or taken away depending on the 
lawfulness or unlawfulness of their sources, but was part and parcel of the right to information, to be 
treated with the utmost caution, even more so in the applicant's case, where he had been under suspi-
cion because of vague, uncorroborated rumours, as subsequently confirmed by the fact that he had not 
been charged. The Court also took into account the amount of property seized and considered that 
although the reasons given by the Belgian courts were "relevant", they could not be considered "suffi-
cient" to justify the impugned searches. The European Court accordingly found that there had been a 
violation of Article 10 of the Convention
16
. 
Financial Times Ltd. and others v. the United Kingdom (violation of Article 10) 
In 2002 British courts decided in favour of a disclosure order in the case of Interbrew SA v. Financial 
Times and others. The case concerns the order against four newspapers (FT, The Times, The Guardian 
and The Independent) and the news agency Reuters to deliver up their original copies of a leaked and 
(apparently) partially forged document about a contemplated takeover by Interbrew (now: Anheuser 
Busch InBev NV) of SAB (South African Breweries). In a judgment of 15 December 2009 the European 
Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section) has come to the conclusion that this disclosure order was a 
violation of the right of freedom of expression and information, which includes press freedom and the 
right of protection of journalistic sources as protected by Article 10 of the European Convention of 
Human Rights. 
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The European Court of Human Rights has come to the conclusion that the British judicial authorities in 
the Interbrew case have neglected the interests related to the protection of journalistic sources, by 
overemphasizing the interests and arguments in favour of source disclosure. The Court accepts that the 
disclosure order in the Interbrew case was prescribed by law (Norwich Pharmacal and Section 10 of the 
Contempt of Court Act 1981) and was intended to protect the rights of others and to prevent the disclo-
sure of information received in confidence, both of which are legitimate aims. The Court however does 
not consider the disclosure order necessary in a democratic society. Disclosure orders of journalistic 
sources have a detrimental impact not only on the source in question, whose identity may be revealed, 
but also on the newspaper against which the order is directed, whose reputation may be negatively 
affected in the eyes of future potential sources by the disclosure, and on the members of the public, 
who have an interest in receiving information imparted through anonymous sources and who are also 
potential sources themselves. The Courts accepts that it may be true that the public perception of the 
principle of non-disclosure of sources would suffer no real damage where it was overridden in circum-
stances where a source was clearly acting in bad faith with a harmful purpose and disclosed intentional-
ly falsified information. The Court makes clear however that domestic courts should be slow to assume, 
in the absence of compelling evidence, that these factors are present in any particular case. The Court 
emphasizes most importantly that “the conduct of the source can never be decisive in determining 
whether a disclosure order ought to be made but will merely operate as one, albeit important, factor to 
be taken into consideration in carrying out the balancing exercise required under Article 10 § 2” (§ 63). 
The European Court of Human Rights comes to the conclusion that the British Courts have given too 
much weight to the alleged bogus character of the leaked document and to the assumption that the 
source had acted mala fide.  While the Court considers that there may be circumstances in which the 
source's harmful purpose would in itself constitute a relevant and sufficient reason to make a disclosure 
order, the legal proceedings against the four newspapers and Reuters did not allow X's purpose to be 
ascertained with the necessary degree of certainty. The Court therefore does not place significant 
weight on X's alleged purpose in the present case, but does clearly emphasize the public interest in the 
protection of journalistic sources. The Court accordingly, finds that Interbrew's interests in eliminating, 
by proceedings against X, the threat of damage through future dissemination of confidential infor-
mation and in obtaining damages for past breaches of confidence were, even if considered cumulative-
ly, insufficient to outweigh the public interest in the protection of journalists' sources. The judicial order 
to deliver up the report at issue is considered a violation of Article 10 of the Convention
17
. 
 
Sanoma Uitgevers BV v. the Netherlands (violation of Article 10) 
 
On 31 March 2009 the Chamber of the Third Section of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
delivered a highly controversial judgment in the case of Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v. the Netherlands. With 
a 4/3 decision the Court was of the opinion that the order to hand over a CD-ROM with photographs in 
the possession of the editor-in-chief of a weekly magazine claiming protection of journalistic sources, 
did not amount to a violation of Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights. The finding 
and motivation of the majority of the Chamber was not only strongly disapproved in the world of media 
and journalism, but was also firmly criticised by the dissenting judges. Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. requested 
for a referral to the Grand Chamber, this request being supported by a large number of media, NGOs 
advocating media freedom and professional organisations of journalists. On 14 September 2009 the 
panel of five Judges decided to refer the case to the Grand Chamber in application of Article 43 of the 
Convention. By referring the case to the Grand Chamber the panel accepted that the case raised a seri-
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ous question affecting the interpretation or application of Article 10 of the Convention and/or con-
cerned a serious issue of general importance. 
On 14 September 2010, the 17 judges of the Grand Chamber unanimously reached the conclusion that 
the order to hand over the CD-ROM to the public prosecutor was a violation of the journalists’ rights to 
protect their sources. It noted that orders to disclose sources potentially had a detrimental impact, not 
only on the source, whose identity might be revealed, but also on the newspaper or publication against 
which the order was directed, whose reputation might be negatively affected in the eyes of future po-
tential sources by the disclosure, and on members of the public, who had an interest in receiving infor-
mation imparted through anonymous sources. Protection of journalists’ sources is indeed to be consid-
ered “a cornerstone of freedom of the press, without which sources may be deterred from assisting the 
press in informing the public on matters of public interest. As a result the vital public-watchdog role of 
the press may be undermined and the ability of the press to provide accurate and reliable information 
to the public may be adversely affected”. In essence the Grand Chamber is of the opinion that the right 
to protect journalistic sources should be safeguarded by sufficient procedural guarantees, including the 
guarantee of prior review by a judge or an independent and impartial decision-making body, before the 
police or the public prosecutor have access to information capable of revealing such sources. Although 
the public prosecutor, like any public official, is bound by requirements of basic integrity, in terms of 
procedure he or she is a “party” defending interests potentially incompatible with journalistic source 
protection and can hardly be seen as objective and impartial so as to make the necessary assessment of 
the various competing interests. As in the case of Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v. the Netherlands an ex ante 
guarantee of a review by a judge or independent and impartial body was not existing, the Grand Cham-
ber is of the opinion that “the quality of the law was deficient in that there was no procedure attended 
by adequate legal safeguards for the applicant company in order to enable an independent assessment 
as to whether the interest of the criminal investigation overrode the public interest in the protection of 
journalistic sources”. Emphasizing the importance of the protection of journalistic sources for press 
freedom in a democratic society the Grand Chamber of the European Court finds a violation of Article 
10 of the Convention. The judgment implies that member states of the Convention shall build in proce-
dural safeguards in their national law in terms of a judicial review or other impartial assessment by an 
independent body based on clear criteria of subsidiarity and proportionality and prior to any disclosure 
of information capable of revealing the identity or the origin of journalists’ sources
18
. 
 
Martin and others v. France (violation of Article 10) 
 
In Martin a.o. v. France the ECtHR again found a violation of Article 10 in a case related to the protec-
tion of journalists’ sources. The concerns a search of the premises of the Midi Libre daily newspaper 
ordered by an investigating judge and the investigation against journalists of the newspaper in order to 
determine in what circumstances and  conditions they had obtained a copy of a confidential draft report 
of the Regional Audit Office concerning the management of the Languedoc-Roussillon region. The Midi 
Libre published several articles quoting passages from the report, even though it was legally confiden-
tial. The report was obviously leaked to the journalists of Midi Libre. A complaint was lodged against the 
journalists Francois Martin, Jacky Vilaceque and Anthony Jones, together with an application to initiate 
proceedings for breach of professional secrecy and handling of information thus disclosed. In order to 
determine in what circumstances the journalists had obtained the confidential information, the investi-
gating judge, assisted by a computer expert, decided to order a search of the newspaper’s premises. 
Various documents were seized and placed under seal, including a copy of the Audit Office report. The 
judge also had copies made of the computer hard drives of the journalists concerned. Analysis of the 
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hard drives revealed traces of the Audit office report on two journalists’ computers. The investigation 
however failed to reveal who had given or sent the confidential report to the journalists. Following the 
investigation, the judge placed four journalists of Midi Libre under investigation for handling infor-
mation disclosed in breach of professional secrecy. When questioned by the judge, they all exercised 
their right as journalists to protect their sources. 
The journalists requested that the search and all the subsequent proceedings be set aside, arguing that 
they were in violation of the freedom of expression protected by Article 10 of the Convention. In a 
judgment of the investigation chamber of the Montpellier Court of Appeal rejected their request, point-
ing out that the search had been carried out to determine how the journalists had managed to obtain 
information from a confidential report. It added that the principle of the protection of journalistic 
sources should not obstruct the search for the truth in criminal matters, which could legitimately be 
pursued by searching press offices and seizing evidence. The journalists lodged an appeal on points of 
law, arguing that in failing to verify whether the search had pursued a legitimate aim and had been 
necessary, in a democratic society, to achieve that aim, the Court of Appeal had violated Article 10 of 
the Convention. The Court of Cassation rejected the appeal, considering that the search had been con-
ducted in conformity with criminal procedure and that the interference had been necessary and propor-
tionate to the legitimate aim pursued, namely the protection of the rights of others – in this case the 
presumption of innocence –, the protection of confidential information and the need to prevent behav-
iour that obstructed the search for the truth. 
 
In the interim, however, the investigating judge had discharged the journalists, noting that it had not 
been possible to establish that the person who had leaked the information was bound by a duty of 
professional secrecy, and that as no prior offence had been established, the charge of handling infor-
mation disclosed as a result of a breach of that duty could not stand. In a judgment of the Montpellier 
Court of Appeal it was confirmed that as no breach of professional secrecy had been established, there 
could be no offence of handling information disclosed as a result of such a breach. 
 
The four journalists complained in Strasbourg that the investigation to which they had been subjected 
had violated the provisions of Article 10 of the Convention. The European Court reiterated that it had 
already found that searches conducted in journalists’ homes or places of work with a view to identifying 
the sources of breaches of professional secrecy infringed the rights protected by Article 10 of the Con-
vention. In this case there had been interference with the journalists’ freedom to receive or communi-
cate information. In the Court’s view, that interference had been prescribed by law and its aim had 
been to prevent the publication of confidential information and to protect the rights of others, in par-
ticular the presumption of innocence. The crux of the matter was whether the interference was “neces-
sary in a democratic society”, answered a pressing social need and was proportionate to the legitimate 
aim pursued, and whether the reasons given by the authorities to justify it were relevant and sufficient. 
 
The Court noted that the applicants were journalists who had published articles in a daily newspaper 
containing extracts from a draft report by the Languedoc-Roussillon Regional Audit Office criticising the 
management of the region when J.B. was president of the council. The offending articles mainly con-
tained information concerning the management of public funds by elected officials, which was criticised 
in the report. The Court had no doubt that this was a topic of general interest that the journalists were 
entitled to bring to the attention of the public. The role of investigative journalists was precisely to 
inform and alert the public, particularly of bad news, as soon as the information came into their posses-
sion. The journalists had mentioned on the first page of the newspaper that the information came from 
“a draft report that might be amended in the light of the response of the people it criticised”. The Court 
considered that the journalists had made a clear presentation of the report in question that displayed 
their good faith and respect for the ethics of their profession.  
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The Court noted also that the report in question had been communicated to the former president of the 
Languedoc-Roussillon regional council and that extracts had been sent to the seventy people criticised 
in the report. The judge who had placed the journalists under investigation had stated in his order that 
the investigation had failed to establish whether the person at the origin of the leak had been bound by 
a duty of professional secrecy. The investigation chamber of the Montpellier Court of Appeal had noted 
that the people to whom the report had been sent were not bound by a duty of professional secrecy, 
and that according to the Financial Judicature Code, documents in draft form were not automatically 
classified. The Court wondered whether measures other than searching the newspaper’s offices might 
have enabled the investigating judge to determine whether there had been a breach of professional 
secrecy. The Government had failed to demonstrate that without the search the authorities would have 
been unable to seek evidence, first, that there had been a breach of professional secrecy and then that 
information thus wrongfully obtained had been published. The Court therefore concluded that the 
French Government had not demonstrated that the competing interests – namely the protection of 
journalists’ sources and the prevention and repression of crime – had been properly balanced. The 
reasons given by the authorities to justify the search could be considered relevant, but not sufficient. 
The search had accordingly been disproportionate and had violated the journalists’ right to freedom of 
expression and information under Article 10 of the Convention
19
. 
 
Ressiot and others v. France (violation of Article 10) 
 
In this judgment the European Court has re-emphasized the importance to protect journalists’ sources, 
this time in a case of searches and seizures carried out at the French sporting daily L'Equipe, the weekly 
magazine Le Point and at the homes of some of their journalists. The Court considered the interferences 
with the journalists’ right to have their sources protected as disproportionate to the interest of demo-
cratic society in ensuring and maintaining a free press. This judgment comes only a few months after 
the European Court’s finding of a violation of Article 10 by the French authorities for disrespecting the 
protection of journalists’ sources in the case of Martin and others v. France. 
 
The case Ressiot and Others v. France concerns the investigations carried out at the premises of 
L’Equipe and Le Point, and at the homes of five journalists accused of breaching the confidentiality of a 
judicial investigation. Both newspapers had published in 2004 a series of articles about an ongoing 
investigation on alleged doping by the Cofidis cycle racing team in the Tour de France, an investigation 
carried out by the Drugs Squad. The French authorities wanted to identify the source of the leaks the 
journalist were obviously relying on to substantiate their reporting  about the case. Cofidis in the mean-
time had lodged an urgent application for an injunction against new articles to be published, alleging 
that they made insulting assertions and breached the presumption of innocence and the confidentiality 
of the judicial  investigation. Cofidis also lodged a criminal complaint against a person or persons un-
known, for breach of confidentiality and use of information thus obtained. In January 2005 the public 
prosecutor ordered a series of searches in order to uncover traces of the leaked documents.  
Short time later the five journalists requested that all the material seized during the searches at the 
newspapers’ offices and their homes, be declared null and void. The investigative measures concerning 
the newspapers’ switchboards and the telephone lines of certain journalists were indeed considered 
null and void by the French courts. But by contrast, the seizure and placing under seal of certain materi-
als were considered to be legitimate interferences with the protection of journalists’ sources. The 
French courts on the other hand dropped the charges against the journalists of using unlawfully ob-
tained information. All five accused journalists were acquitted.  
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Still, the five journalist lodged an application with the European Court of Human Rights, complaining 
that the investigations against them had been carried out in violation of Article 10 of the  Convention. 
 
In its judgment the Court reiterates the importance of the protection of journalistic sources as one of 
the cornerstones of freedom of the press. Without such protection, sources might be deterred from 
assisting the press in  informing the public. As a result the vital public-watchdog role of the press might 
be  undermined and the ability of the press to provide accurate and reliable information might be ad-
versely affected. Also referring to the importance of media reporting in informing the public on criminal 
proceedings and  ensuring public scrutiny of the functioning of the criminal justice system. The Court 
did accept that the interference by the French authorities out of concern for the confidentiality of the 
investigation had been aimed at preventing the disclosure of confidential information, protecting the 
reputation of others, ensuring  the proper conduct of the investigation and therefore protecting the 
authority and  impartiality of the judiciary, these all being legitimate aims as such to interfere with the 
right of freedom of expression. While recognizing the vital role played by the press in a democratic 
society, the Court also stressed that journalists could not, in principle, be released from their duty to 
obey the ordinary criminal law.  The Court noted that when the searches were carried out and the tele-
phone calls tapped, the sole aim had been to identify the source of the information published in the 
newspaper articles. The Court however pointed out that the right of journalists not to disclose their 
sources could not be considered a mere privilege to be granted or taken away depending on the lawful-
ness  or unlawfulness of their sources, but was part and parcel of the right to information. The  seizure 
and placing under seal of the lists of the telephone calls of the journalists, the searches carried out at 
their homes, and the searches and seizures  carried out at the offices of Le Point and L’Equipe had been 
allowed by the investigation division without any evidence showing the existence of an overriding social 
need, according to the European Court. The Court concluded that the French Government had not 
shown that a fair balance had been  struck between the various interests involved. Even if the reasons 
given were relevant, the Court considered that they did not suffice to justify the searches and seizures 
carried out. The means used were not reasonably proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued having 
regard to the interest of a democratic society in ensuring and maintaining the  freedom of the press. 
Hence the Court, unanimously, came to the conclusion that there had  been a violation of Article 10 of 
the Convention
20
. 
3. Recommendation (2000) 7 “on the right of journalists not to disclose their sources of information” 
The references just mentioned make clear that in the countries referred to (Luxembourg, Belgium, The 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Denmark, France) the level and the characteristics of the protection 
of journalistic sources are or were rather uncertain and unclear and are subject to very different ap-
proaches by the police, the public prosecutors, investigative judges and the courts. Over the years also 
in many other countries of the Council of Europe cases have been reported of actions by police or judi-
cial authorities not sufficiently respecting the protection of journalistic sources as guaranteed by Article 
10 of the European Convention, in line with the Court’s case law since 1996. It is also to be underlined 
that the Strasbourg Court left open a margin of appreciation by introducing the notion of "an overriding 
requirement in the public interest" that can legitimise a disclosure order. 
In order to work out some more practical guidelines and to guarantee an effective protection of journal-
istic sources in the member states, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted Rec-
ommendation (2000) 7 "on the right of journalists not to disclose their sources of information" (8 March 
2000)
 21
. 
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Principle 1 of the Recommendation stipulates that "domestic law and practice in member states should 
provide for explicit and clear protection of the right of journalists not to disclose information identifying 
a source in accordance with Article 10 of the Convention (..) and the principles established herein, which 
are to be considered as minimum standards for the respect of this right". The right of journalists not to 
disclose their sources is to be recognised and organised for "any natural or legal person who is regularly 
or professionally engaged in the collection and dissemination of information to the public via any means 
of communication". 
Principle 2 of the Recommendation broadens the scope of application of the protection of sources to all 
persons "who, by their professional relations with journalist, acquire knowledge of information identify-
ing a source through the collection, editorial processing or dissemination of this information". 
According to the Recommendation the protection of journalistic sources should have a broad field of 
application: "Journalists may receive their information from all kinds of sources. Therefore, a wide inter-
pretation of this term is necessary. The actual provision of information to journalists can constitute an 
action on the side of the source, for example when a source calls or writes to a journalist or sends to him 
or her recorded information or pictures. Information shall also be regarded as being "provided" when a 
source remains passive and consents to the journalist taking the information, such as the filming or 
recording of information with the consent of the source". 
The notion of "information identifying a source" must be broadly interpreted, because it is necessary to 
protect all kinds of information which are likely to lead to the identification of a source. As far as its 
disclosure may lead to an identification of a source, the following information is to be protected accord-
ing to the Recommendation: 
i. the name of a source and his or her address, telephone and telefax number, employer's name and 
other personal data as well as the voice of the source and pictures showing a source; 
ii. "the factual circumstances of acquiring this information", for example the time and place of a meet-
ing with a source, the means of correspondence used or the particularities agreed between a source 
and a journalist; 
iii. "the unpublished content of the information provided by a source to a journalist", for example other 
facts, data, sounds or pictures which may indicate a source's identity and which have not yet been pub-
lished by the journalist; 
iv. personal data of journalists and their employers related to their professional work", i.e. personal 
data produced by the work of journalists, which could be found, for example, in address lists, lists of 
telephone calls, registrations of computer-based communications, travel arrangements or bank state-
ments
22
. 
The nature of the information is not relevant and can include oral or written statements, sounds or 
pictures.  
According to principle 3 of the Recommendation a compelling order to reveal a source is only legitimate 
when it can be convincingly established that: i. reasonable alternative measures to the disclosure do not 
exist or have been exhausted by the persons or public authorities that seek the disclosure, and ii. the 
legitimate interest in the disclosure clearly outweighs the public interest in the non-disclosure, bearing in 
mind that:  - an overriding requirement of the need for disclosure is proved, - the circumstances are of a 
sufficiently vital and serious nature, - the necessity of the disclosure is identified as responding to a 
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pressing social need, and, - member states enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in assessing this need, 
but this margin goes hand in hand with the supervision by the European Court of Human Rights. 
The first condition refers to the subsidiarity principle: the persons or public authorities seeking a disclo-
sure should primarily search for and apply proportionate alternative measures, which adequately pro-
tect their respective rights and interests and at the same time are less intrusive with regard to the pro-
tection of the right of journalists not to disclose their source. The existence of reasonable alternative 
measures for the protection of a legitimate interest excludes the necessity of disclosing the source by 
the journalist and the parties seeking the disclosure have to exhaust these alternatives at first. 
The second condition refers to the proportionality principle. The public interest in the non-disclosure 
could, according to the Explanatory Memorandum be outweighed where the disclosure is necessary for 
"the protection of human life" and "the prevention of major crime". In the latter category are typically 
activities which may contribute to or result in such crimes as murder, manslaughter, severe bodily inju-
ry, crimes against national security, or serious organised crime. The prevention of such crimes can pos-
sibly justify the disclosure of a journalist's source. 
It is also recognised that a disclosure order can be legitimate for "the defence in the course of legal 
proceedings of a person who is accused or convicted of having committed a serious crime". In the Ex-
planatory Memorandum it is explicitly mentioned that the right of defence of a person, who is accused 
or convicted of having committed a major crime may possibly justify the disclosure of a journalist's 
source. 
The disclosure order must also be "prescribed by law" and it must be pertinently argued in every case 
why the disclosure order in casu is necessary in a democratic society, with a clear motivation why the 
conditions of subsidiarity and proportionality are fulfilled. Only where and as far as an overriding re-
quirement in the public interest exists and if the circumstances are of a sufficiently vital and serious 
nature, a disclosure might be considered necessary in a democratic society in accordance with Article 10 
§ 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Principle 3 of the Recommendation stipulates the 
requirements for the evaluation of such necessity. 
Principle 4 of the Recommendation stipulates, in line with the judgment in the case De Haes and Gijsels 
v. Belgium, that in legal proceedings against a journalist on grounds of an alleged infringement of the 
honour or reputation of a person, authorities should consider, for the purpose of establishing the truth 
or otherwise of the allegation, all evidence which is available to them under national procedural law 
and may not require for that purpose the disclosure of information identifying a source by the journal-
ist. If in a defamation case alternative evidence for the proof of the journalist's statements is available 
to the judiciary, respect should be demonstrated towards the protection of journalistic sources. 
Principle 5 refers to some procedural conditions which must be fulfilled for initiating any action against 
a journalist aimed at the disclosure of sources. One of the recommendations is that journalists should 
be informed by the competent authorities of their right not to disclose information identifying a source 
as well as of the limits of this right before disclosure is requested (cfr. principle 3). Sanctions against 
journalists for not disclosing information identifying a source should only be imposed by judicial author-
ities during court proceedings which allow for a hearing of the journalists concerned in accordance with 
Article 6 of the European Convention ("fair trial"). 
Principle 6 provides that the following measures should not be applied if their purpose is to circumvent 
the right of journalists not to disclose information identifying a source:  
i. interception orders or actions concerning communication or correspondence of journalists or their 
employers, 
ii. surveillance orders or actions concerning journalists, their contacts or their employers, or 
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iii. search or seizure orders or actions concerning the private or business premises, belongings or corre-
spondence of journalists or their employers or personal data related to their professional work. 
The Explanatory Memorandum of Recommendation (2000) 7 considers that "journalist's private or 
business premises, belongings or correspondence or personal data related to their work may contain 
information which could lead to the disclosure of a source. The same situation exists with respect to the 
business premises, belongings, archives or personal data of the journalist's employer. Any search or 
seizure action might reveal information identifying a source." Judicial authorities ordering such search or 
seizure therefore should limit their search and seizure order with respect to the protection of a journal-
ist's source. 
Principle 7 finally refers to the protection against self-incrimination.  
It is to be underlined that the circumstance that information was gathered in an illegal way or that the 
source disclosed the information to the journalist in breach of his or her own obligation of professional 
confidentiality, may not deprive a journalist of his right of protection of sources.  
Action is to be undertaken to make that these basic principles of the Recommendation (2000) 7 are 
better implemented in the law and the jurisprudence of the Council of Europe Member States. The 
Committee of Ministers recommended the member states to "implement in their domestic law and 
practice the principles appended to this recommendation" and "to disseminate widely this recommenda-
tion and its appended principles, where appropriate accompanied by a translation, and to bring them in 
particular to the attention of public authorities, police authorities and the judiciary as well as to make 
them available to journalists, the media and their professional organisations". 
 
4. The PACE-Recommendation Rec. 1950 (2011) on the protection of journalists’ sources
23
. 
 
In a Recommendation of 25 January 2011 the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe again 
has insisted that the member states should take appropriate and effective measures in order to protect 
the right of journalists not to reveal the identity or origin of their sources: “The Assembly notes with 
concern the large number of cases in which public authorities in Europe have forced, or attempted to 
force, journalists to disclose their sources, despite the clear standards set by the European Court of 
Human Rights and the Committee of Ministers. These violations are more frequent in member states 
without clear legislation. In cases of investigative journalism, the protection of sources is of even great-
er importance, as stated in the Committee of Ministers’ Declaration of 26 September 2007 on the pro-
tection and promotion of investigative journalism”. The Assembly also refers to the right of every per-
son to disclose confidentially to the media, or by other means, information about unlawful acts and 
other wrongdoings of public concern, recalling its Resolution 1729 (2010) and Recommendation 1916 
(2010) on the protection of “whistle-blowers”. It  reaffirms that member states should review legislation 
                                                           
23
http://assembly.coe.int/mainf.asp?Link=/documents/adoptedtext/ta11/erec1950.htm. In contrast with the 2000/7 Rec-
ommendation of the Committee of Ministers the Assembly  under section 15 of the Recommendation 1950 (2011) suggest 
to reduce the right of protection of journalists’ sources ‘ratione personae’. It is also remarkable, and in contrast with the 
case of the European Court, that the Recommendation refers to this right as ‘a privilege’. The Assembly indeed considers 
that “the right of journalists not to disclose their sources of information is a professional privilege, intended to encourage 
sources to provide journalists with important information which they would not give without a commitment to confidenti-
ality. The same relationship of trust does not exist with regard to non-journalists, such as individuals with their own website 
or web blog. Therefore, non-journalists cannot benefit from the right of journalists not to reveal their sources”.  
 
 
 
Articles 
 
18  
in this respect to ensure consistency of domestic rules with the European standards enshrined in these 
texts. It is also emphasized that “Internet service providers and telecommunication companies should 
not be obliged to disclose information which may lead to the identification of journalists’ sources in 
violation of Article 10 of the Convention”. The Assembly furthermore insists on the need to ensure that 
legal provisions enacted by member states when transposing the Union’s Directive 2006/24/EC of 15 
March 2006 on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of public-
ly available electronic communications are consistent with the right of journalists not to disclose their 
sources under Article 10 of the Convention and with the right to privacy under Article 8 of the Conven-
tion. 
In sum, the Assembly recommends that the Committee of Ministers:  
“17.1. call on those member states which do not have legislation specifying the right of journalists not 
to disclose their sources of information, to pass such legislation in accordance with the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights and Committee of Ministers Recommendation No. R (2000) 7;  
17.2. assist member states in analysing and improving their legislation on the protection of the confi-
dentiality of journalists’ sources, in particular by supporting the review of their national laws on surveil-
lance, anti-terrorism, data retention and access to telecommunications records;  
17.3. ask its competent steering committee to draw up, in co-operation with journalists’ and media 
freedom organisations, guidelines for prosecutors and the police, as well as training material for judges, 
on the right of journalists not to disclose their sources of information, in accordance with Committee of 
Ministers Recommendations Nos. R (2000) 7 and Rec(2003)13 and the case law of the European Court 
of Human Rights;  
17.4. ask its competent steering committee to draw up guidelines for public authorities and private 
service providers concerning the protection of the confidentiality of journalists’ sources in the context 
of the interception or disclosure of computer data and traffic data of computer networks in accordance 
with Articles 16 and 17 of the Convention on Cybercrime and Articles 8 and 10 of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights”. 
In some countries Recommendation (2000)7 of the Council of Europe has been an incentive to start 
developing at national level effective guarantees to protect the journalists’ sources.  
In the Netherlands in 2002 a circular letter ("Aanwijzing") of the college of attorneys-general contained 
the relevant guidelines for the police and the public prosecutor's office in order to respect the protec-
tion of journalistic sources
24
. Although these guidelines had no status of formal law, they were intended 
to reflect a clear option to protect journalistic sources in a confrontation with the police and the public 
prosecutor
25
. The Grand Chamber judgment of 14 September 2010 in the case of Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. 
v. the Netherlands has made clear however that these guidelines did not guarantee sufficient protection 
for the protection of journalistic sources in the Netherlands. A law proposal and a modification of the 
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guidelines has been announced in 2011, but until now only the Guidelines by the college of attorneys-
general have been modified
26
. Although the new guidelines reflect in a better and more effective way 
the standards as they have been developed in the case law of the ECtHR, still by their nature of ‘internal 
guidelines’ for the police and public prosecutors, the guarantees reflected in the “Aanwijzing 2012” 
might not secure in a sufficient and effective way the protection of journalistic sources in the Nether-
lands
27
. 
 
In January 2010 in France the law on protection of journalistic sources had been modified substantially 
in order to meet the standards of the European Human Rights system (Law of 4 January 2010), although 
the new law is still considered insufficiently protective for the journalists’ sources
28
. In a judgment of 7 
December 2011 the Court of Cassation ruled that judge Philippe Courroye, the public prosecutor who 
initiated a procedure to identify information leaks in the "Woerth-Bettencourt" case in September 
2010, had infringed the law on protection of sources by trying to access detailed phone records of three 
journalists working at the daily newspaper Le Monde. The Court of Cassation holds that the infringe-
ment of the confidentiality of journalists' sources was not justified by the existence of an overriding 
public interest and the measure was not strictly necessary and proportionate to the legitimate aim 
pursued
29
. 
Both in Luxembourg and Belgium steps have been taken earlier to implement the European Court's case 
law and the principles of the Recommendation of the Council of Europe on the protection of journalistic 
sources, especially after the judgments of 2003 in the cases Roemen and Schmit v. Luxembourg and 
Ernst and others v. Belgium (cfr. supra).  
In Luxembourg the Law of 8 June 2004 ("Law on the freedom of expression in the media") explicitly 
recognises the protection of sources of journalists. The Articles 7 and 8 of the Law, under section "De la 
protection des sources" guarantee this right in line with the Recommendation (2000)7 of the Council of 
Europe.  
In Belgium, a law proposal on the protection of journalistic sources has been introduced before parlia-
ment in October 2002, referring also to Recommendation (2002)7 of the Council of Europe. On 15 May 
2003 the Minister of Justice published a circular letter ("Omzendbrief/circulaire") on the protection of 
sources. This circular letter, aimed to inform the public prosecutors, however only contained a short 
summary of the relevant case law of the European Court of Human Rights on the issue, without taking 
any further steps to develop the principles contained in this jurisprudence. In spring 2005 the Belgian 
Parliament finally approved the law on the protection of journalistic sources.  
                                                           
26
Openbaar Ministerie, Aanwijzing toepassing dwangmiddelen bij journalisten 1 maart 2012, Stcrt. 2012, 3656 and 
www.mediareport.nl/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/aanwijzing-toepassing-dwangmiddelen-tegen-journalisten-1-maart-
2012.pdf. See also Mediaforum 2012/4 (Katern, Aanwijzing toepassing dwangmiddelen journalisten, i-iv). 
 
27
O. VOLGENANT, “Journalistieke bronbescherming”, Mediaforum 2012/4, 117. See also http://www.kvdl.nl/KVdL/nl-
NL/_main/Nieuws/Nieuwsbrief/Nieuwsbrief+april+2012/Journalistieke+bronbescherming/ and 
http://www.nuv.nl/nieuws/ndp-nieuws/nieuw-voorschrift-om-biedt-journalisten-betere.183361.lynkx. 
 
28
See www.lemonde.fr/societe/video/2010/09/13/il-y-a-une-loi-sur-la-protection-des-sources-il-faut-la-
respecter_1410689_3224.html; www.slate.fr/story/27665/journalistes-protection-sources-affaires and 
http://europe.ifj.org/en/articles/efj-condemns-actions-by-french-government-against-journalists-rights. 
 
29
Cour d’appel de Bordeaux 5 May 2012 and Cassation 7 December 2011 : 
www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2011/05/07/liberte-de-la-presse-la-justice-leve-une-menace_1518368_3224.html; 
http://combatsdroitshomme.blog.lemonde.fr/2011/12/12/protection-des-sources-journalistiques-parce-que-la-liberte-de-
la-presse-le-vaut-bien-cass-crim-6-decembre-2011/ and www.liberation.fr/societe/01012376007-fadettes-pour-la-cour-de-
cassation-courroye-a-viole-la-loi-sur-le-secret-des-sources. See also http://europe.ifj.org/en/articles/france-efj-welcomes-
legal-victory-on-protection-of-journalists-sources. 
 
Articles 
 
20  
5. The protection of journalists’ sources and the Luxembourg Media Law of 8 June 2004 
In 2004 Luxembourg has taken an important initiative in order to integrate the principles of the Europe-
an Court's case law and of the Recommendation (2000) 7 into the law on freedom of expression in the 
media (Media Law)
30
. 
The Media Law of 8 June 2004 in its Article 7 guarantees that journalists heard as a witness by an ad-
ministrative or judicial authority in the course of administrative or judicial proceedings shall be entitled 
to refuse to disclose information identifying a source, or the content of information that he has ob-
tained or collected. 
The positive evaluation made by P. Wachsmann in his report "Analyse écrite du project de loi Luxem-
bourgeois sur la liberté d'expression dans les médias" is pertinent, especially with regard to the broad 
scope of application of Article 7 of the Luxembourg media law, an approach that is coherently in line 
with the Recommendation of the Council of Europe
31
. The Media Law not only protects journalists: also 
publishers and anyone who in course of their professional relations with a journalist have obtained 
knowledge of information identifying a source, can invoke the right to refuse disclosure of information. 
The possibility of circumventing measures by the police or judicial authorities, such as searches, seizures 
and telephone tapping, in order to unmask the identity of a journalist's sources, is also explicitly re-
stricted (Article 7, 3°). Judicial action and police authorities must refrain from ordering action or taking 
measures with the intention or effect (!) of circumventing this right. The Law explicitly refers to searches 
or seizures at the home or work place of journalists or the persons who are in a professional relation 
with them. Additionally Article 7, 4° of the Media Law considers as illegal evidence any information 
identifying a source, if this information is obtained by way of a legal judicial search or seizure which was 
not aimed at the disclosing the identity of a source. 
The balance in respecting other human rights and the functioning of the judiciary is to be found in Arti-
cle 8 of the media law, which stipulates that where the action of the administrative, judicial or police 
authorities concerns the prevention, prosecution or punishment of serious crimes against the person, 
drug-trafficking, money-laundering, terrorism or offences against the security of the State, journalists 
may not invoke the right of the protection of sources as it mentioned in Article 7. Article 8 clarifies to 
some extend what is meant by the European Court as "an overriding requirement in the public interest". 
This provision enumerates in other words the cases in which the protection of other interests prevails 
over the interest of not disclosing sources. The reference to serious crimes and some other offences 
refer to situations that are generally considered to be sufficiently serious to justify a restriction on the 
protection of sources. In these cases, the pre-eminence of a public interest to suppress and punish one 
of the behaviours covered is presumed and justifies exemption from the principle of protection of 
sources. The approach or Article 8 of the Luxembourg media law however is not fully in line with the 
European Court's case law and Recommendation (2000) 7. As Article 8 is formulated, it might open the 
door for a too wide application of disclosure orders, as both the aspect of subsidiarity and proportional-
ity are not incorporated in this provision. It should indeed not be sufficient as such if an investigation 
deals with serious crimes against the person or some other offences. As Wachsman observed correctly 
in his analysis of the Luxembourg draft law "la définition des cas dans lesquels est supprimé le bénéfice 
du droit de refuser la divulgation des informations identifiant une source et le contenu des informations 
obtenues ou collectées apparaît trop extensive, en contradiction avec ce que préconise la recommenda-
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tion du Comité des Ministres et avec ce que suggère l'exposé des motifs lui-même". The way Article 8 is 
formulated, a journalist may not invoke his right of protection of sources from the moment an action, 
investigation or court case concerns a serious crime or an explicitly mentioned offence. It is obvious that 
this provision not only omitted to refer to the subsidiarity principle ("it must be convincingly established 
that reasonable alternative measures to the disclosure do not exist or have been exhausted by the per-
sons or public authorities that seek the disclosure"). It is also necessary to incorporate as a basic condi-
tion in Article 8 that any disclosure order must pertinently motivate why the legitimate interest in the 
disclosure clearly outweighs the public interest in the non-disclosure. Only by formulating it that way 
the public authorities are invited and obliged to motivate consistently why an overriding requirement of 
the need for disclosure is proved, that the circumstances are of a sufficiently vital and serious nature 
and that the necessity of the disclosure is identified as responding to a pressing social need. To some 
degree however Article 2 of the Media Law can help to reinstall the balance, as this Article provides that 
any restriction or interference in the freedom of expression as protected by Article 10 of the European 
Convention must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued ("toute restriction ou ingérence (..) 
doit répondre à un besion social impérieux et être proportionnée au but poursuivi"). 
A last remark with regard to the Luxembourg Media Law refers to the unclear situation whether a jour-
nalist can lose the protection of his sources as guaranteed by the law, if he has obtained information 
from a source that breached his or her obligation of secrecy of confidentiality
32
. In the Explanatory 
Memorandum of the draft media law it is said: "Protection of sources is therefore required in the name 
of freedom of expression. It is important to stress that its purpose is not to guarantee the impunity of the 
journalist or the source. (..) Only a journalist who lawfully and legally has information may invoke it. The 
judicial authorities maintain the power to avail themselves of every means at their disposal to reveal the 
identity of a source". The Explanatory Memorandum underlines also that "it should be noted that if a 
journalist lawfully possesses information, he or she must be able to use it lawfully, even where the in-
formation is the product of an offence committed by the source. The journalist may not in this case be 
found guilty since he or she has not him- or her self-committed the offence". It is mentioned in the Ex-
planatory Memorandum that the journalist "may not use this privilege where he or she is implicated as 
the author, co-author or accomplice of an offence". The consequences of these different circumstances 
are not very clearly elaborated in the Luxembourg Media Law. The law left open some possibilities to 
circumvent the protection of journalistic sources. This holds the risks that journalistic sources in the 
future will not be protected on a sufficient level. 
6. Belgium: law on the protection of journalists’ sources (7 April 2005) 
In Belgium the discussion about the (lack of) protection of journalists’ sources has often been on, - and 
mostly after short time again off -, the political agenda
33
. Several law proposals have been introduced in 
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Belgian Parliament since 1984
34
, but never a political majority was found to support one of these law 
proposals. New initiatives to elaborate a legal framework for the protection of journalistic sources were 
taken in 2002
35
.  
Since the judgment in the case of Ernst and others v. Belgium (15 July 2003), in which the European 
Court of Human Rights condemned Belgium for unnecessary and disproportionate interferences by the 
judicial authorities which failed to respect the confidentiality of journalistic sources, journalists and their 
professional organisations have called for a legal framework to protect journalistic sources. The request 
for such a legal framework was put on the agenda again after the searches at the office and in the home 
of Stern-journalist Hans Martin Tillack in 2004. In a judgment of 1 December 2004, the Belgian Supreme 
Court (Hof van Cassatie / Court de Cassation) was of the opinion that as part of a legitimate investiga-
tion into bribery of a civil servant of the EU, the searches at H.M. Tillack's home and in the Brussels' 
office of Stern were not to be considered as illegal, nor violated Article 10 of the European Conven-
tion
36
. However, on 27 November 2007 the European Court of Human Rights found a violation of Article 
10 by the Belgian authorities. A strong call for the protection of journalistic sources was also made on 
26 January 2005 at a press conference organised by the newspaper De Morgen, after it was revealed 
that a judicial investigation had taken place with regard to the telephone traffic of one of its journalists 
Anne de Graaf. Also the organisation of Flemish professional journalists and Reporters sans Frontières 
protested sharply against the inspection of reporters' phone records as a manifest disrespect for the 
confidentiality of journalistic sources. The Court of First Instance of Brussels, in a judgment of 29 June 
2007, convicted the Belgian State for infringement of the journalist’s freedom of expression as protect-
ed by Article 19 of the Belgian Constitution and Article 10 of the European Convention. It also recog-
nised firmly the importance of the protection of journalistic sources.
37
 
After long debates in Parliament, finally the law on the protection of journalistic sources of 7 April 2005 
was promulgated and came into force on the 7
th
 May 2005. The new law is very much in line with the 
Committee of Ministers' Recommendation No. R (2000)7 of 8 March 2000 to member States on the 
rights of journalists not to disclose their sources. The law not only formulates a broad notion of who is a 
journalist and what is protected information, it also reduces substantially the possibility of compelling 
journalists to reveal their sources, as well as any kind of investigative measures taken by the judicial 
authorities to circumvent the right of journalists not to reveal their sources. A disclosure order is only in 
accordance with the law if there are no alternative means of access and if the information in the pos-
session of the journalist is crucial for the prevention of crime that constitutes a serious threat to the 
physical integrity of one or more persons. Journalists exercising their right to protection of sources 
cannot be prosecuted for the usage of unlawfully obtained goods (heling / recel), nor for complicity in 
the offence of breach of professional secrecy.  
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In a judgment of 7 June 2006 the Court of Arbitrage (Arbitragehof/Court d'Arbitrage), the Belgian Con-
stitutional Court, confirmed the constitutionality of the law on protection of journalistic sources, broad-
ening for that purpose however the application of the law "ratione personae38". 
The protection of sources as referred to in Article 3 is guaranteed in respect of the following persons 
(Article 2): 
- 1° Anyone directly contributing to the gathering, editing, production or distribution of information for 
the public by way of a medium 
- 2° Editorial staff, which means anyone who in the exercise of his functions may be in a position to have 
knowledge on information that can lead to the revelation of a source, regardless whether this is 
through the gathering, the editorial treatment, the production or the distribution of this information. 
According to the new law, journalists and members of the editorial staff have a right to refuse the dis-
closure of information upon request of the judicial authorities, in four different situations (Article 3): 
-1° if the information may reveal the identity of a source; 
-2° if the information may reveal the nature or the origin of that information; 
-3° if the information may reveal the identity of the author of a text or an audiovisual  
 production; 
-4° if the disclosure may reveal the content of the information and of the documents  
 themselves, if that may lead to the informant being identified. 
Journalists or editorial staff can however exceptionally be compelled by a judge to disclose infor-
mation revealing a source under the circumstances of Article 4 in a far as three cumulative conditions 
are fulfilled: 
-1° the information relates to crimes that constitute a serious threat to the physical integrity of one or 
more persons; 
-2° the requested information is of crucial importance for the prevention of these crimes; 
-3° and the requested information cannot be obtained in another way. 
According to Article 5 detection measures and investigative measures shall not apply to data relating to 
information sources of journalists and editorial staff, unless the data may prevent the crimes referred to 
in Article 4 and subject to the conditions set out under that Article. 
Article 6 stipulates that journalists and editorial staff (the persons referred to in Article 2) cannot be 
prosecuted under Article 505 of the Belgian Criminal Code when they are exercising their right to keep 
silent about their sources. Article 505 of the Criminal Code punishes inter alia those who receive or use 
documents which have been stolen or have been obtained by crime (e.g. after breach of the duty of 
professional secrecy by others). Also in case of a breach of professional secrecy in the terms of Article 
458 of the Criminal Code, the persons referred to in Article 2 cannot be prosecuted under Article 67, 
par. 4 of the Criminal Code when they are exercising their right to keep silent about their sources, which 
means that journalists and editorial staff in these circumstances cannot be prosecuted for complicity in 
the offence of breach of confidence.  
Since May 2005 the Belgian law is protecting journalistic sources in accordance with Article 10 of the 
European Convention
39
. The Belgian law of 7 April 2005 can undoubtedly inspire other countries to 
                                                           
38
Arbitragehof 7 June 2006, nr. 91/2006, A&M 2008, 130. See also D. VOORHOOF, "Arbitragehof verruimt toepassing jour-
nalistiek bronnengeheim", De Juristenkrant 2006/132, 17. 
 
39
Notice however that the law of 4 February 2010 on Special Investigative Measures by State Security and Intelligence 
Services reduces to some extent the protection guaranteed by the Law of 7 April 2005: Wet van 30 november 1998 
Articles 
 
24  
develop new standards of protection of journalistic, "having regard to the importance of the protection 
of journalistic sources for press freedom in a democratic society and the potentially chilling effect an 
order of source disclosure has on the exercise of that freedom"
40
. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                 
houdende regeling  van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten, gew. Wet van 4 februari 2010 betreffende de methoden 
voor het verzamelen van gegevens door de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten, BS 10 maart 2010. The law of 4 February 
2010 makes, under strict conditions and with extra procedural guarantees towards only professional journalists (in the 
sense of the law of 30 December 1963), investigative measures and searches possible when journalists themselves are 
under a serious suspicion of being personally and actively involved in activities with a ‘potential threat’ to security, such as 
state security, international relations, military security, economic and scientific potential, espionage, terrorism… For such 
specific or exceptional investigative measures no court order is required: the authorization is only needed by the director of 
the state security services, after having obtained a positive advice by a special commission or the competent Minister. The 
president of the association of professional journalists is informed in advance in case such specific or exceptional investiga-
tive measures or searches against professional journalists will be undertaken. Also in other countries the legal framework 
applicable for and the methods used by security and intelligence services hold clear risks for breach of the right of protec-
tion of journalists’ sources. See in this context the pending case Telegraaf Media Nederland Landelijke Media B.V. a.o. v. the 
Netherlands at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng-press/pages/search.aspx#{"display":["1"],"dmdocnumber":["909730"]}. 
On 19 June 2012 the European Court of Human Rights held a hearing on the case, webcasted via 
www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/Press/Multimedia/Webcasts+of+public+hearings/ 
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